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SUMMARY
Judgment is central to the practice of medicine and occurs between making clinical observations
and taking clinical decisions. Clinical judgment analysis has developed as a method of making
statistically firm models of doctors' judgments. Computed models reveal the differential
importance attached to items of clinical, social, or other data which are determinants of clinical
decisions. These models can both reveal the causes of conflicts of judgment and may help resolve
them in a way that unaided discussion cannot. Revealing experts' models to students speeds
learning of diagnostic skills. Clinical judgment analysis offers a method of probing the
judgments not just of students and doctors but also of patients who have shown systematic
differences in their perceptions of risk and benefit. The power and relevance of clinical trials can
be improved by the consistent application of judgment policies generated from both the trialists
and those who will use their results.
INTRODUCTION
Like all living organisms, doctors use information from their environment to help them
decide on appropriate actions. In the medical world this usually means choosing treatments
for a diagnosed illness. The process of making a diagnosis is complex and not fully
understood, but basically involves the collection of items of clinical data, usually symptoms,
signs, and laboratory results, and then using this information to make a judgment about the
probability of the presence of specified diseases. The selection and measurement of clinical
data is subject to many errors and biases which can prejudice the quality of subsequent
decisions. The problems of observer error, the need to minimize it and the means of doing so
are generally well-known. However, even if perfect observation were possible, good
judgment is still required if accurate diagnoses are to be reached. It is surprising that there are
so few systematic studies of clinical judgment, even though it is central to the practice of
medicine. Systematic variations in medical practice are common and are being revealed more
often, as medical audit is more widely practiced. It seems unlikely that these variations can be
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simply attributed to observational errors: some will be related to differences between doctors
in the clinical judgment policies which they operate.
We first report the methods which have been developed to separate judgment from
observation and to measure variations in judgment between doctors and then go on to
summarize how models of medical judgment have been developed for specific medical
problems, show how these models can be used to improve physicians'judgments and review
the reactions of the physicians who took part in the experiments. We conclude by
considering future implications for medical education and medical practice.
The study of clinical judgment can be approached in many ways, but this paper centres on
recent applications of Social Judgment Theory [1] to the problem of combining observations
as a basis for action (i.e. making judgments). Social judgment analysis takes account of the
fact that we work in a probabilistic environment in which the evidence we gather bears an
imperfect relationship to its cause. In medicine this is exemplified by the variety of diseases
which might produce a given symptom, and the variety of symptoms which may arise from a
particular disease. It seems likely that the process of medical judgment involves interpreting
these superficial characteristics on a probabilistic basis which reflects these underlying
uncertainties. Brunswik [2] outlined and Hammond el al. [3] developed the 'lens' model as a
graphical and mathematically rigorous model of judgment (Fig. 1).
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Doctor's judgement
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FIG. 1. Brunswik's lens model applied to disease assessment. The criterion to be judged might be the
presence or the activity of a disease. This is manifest as any number of cues or indicants which
traditionally take the form of symptoms, signs, or laboratory variables. The relationship between them
and the criterion are usually indicated by the correlation coefficients (rcn). It is these cues that the doctor
takes into account when making a judgment about the disease. His pattern of cue utilization is
apparent from the correlations they have with his judgments (rsn). This lens model paradigm allows
systematic differences between doctors judgments to be displayed in terms of the differences in the
weights of importance attached to the various cues, and differences in the combination rule used to
arrive at a final judgment. When there is some way to approach the criterion independently the doctor's
weights can be compared with the 'correct' weights.
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Brunswik argued that judgments are based on pieces of information bearing uncertain
relationships to the underlying nature of the condition being assessed. These could best be
described using multiple regression analysis to relate a series of judgments made by a
particular observer (as the dependent variable) to the various data on which the judgments
were made (independent variables). Such analyses should theoretically allow for non-linear
and discontinuous relationships, but in practice linear regression has proved adequate for
modelling the majority of judgment situations [4]. This approach has been increasingly and
successfully applied to practical clinical problems and has allowed the construction of
explicit models which often fit closely the judgments physicians actually make.
SEPARATING OBSERVATION FROM JUDGMENT
To some extent the processes of observation and judgment are always interwoven. For
example, observing the murmur of aortic stenosis involves a judgment about how much of
systole is occupied by the sound. To make proper comparisons between and within
individual doctors the same clinical material would have to be presented to a number of
observers on a single occasion, or a single observer on different occasions. With live patients
this is difficult or impossible. Even ways of presenting records of the same material
repeatedly, such as using videotape recordings, would not necessarily separate the functions
of the 'observer' from those of the 'judge'. The material needs to be not so much pre-recorded
as pre-scored and presented as laboratory test data, clinical observation, extracts from the
patient's history etc. in a way that is identical for all judges. Such presentations may be made
by a computer programmed to generate clinically plausible values or by using values taken
from patient records and presented in a simple form. They are usually described as 'case
vignettes', 'scenarios' or 'paper patients' and contain a scene setting element which is
invariant across all cases and a variable element representing the clinical data under study [5,
6].
'Paper patients' (or their equivalent) must, however, simulate true clinical encounters
sufficiently well for the judgments they induce to match those that the physician makes when
seeing real patients with the same signs and symptoms. In order to establish whether this is
the case three studies have been performed. The first compared judgments about disease
severity made on patients in rheumatology clinics with those made by the same physicians on
the same set of observations, presented as paper patients some weeks later [6]. Figure 2 shows
a typical result, with a correlation coefficient between the two sets of judgments of A-= 0.9. In
the second study judgments about the severity of signs of otitis media were compared with
those made when the real patient has been examined, and again a reasonable (though less
good) agreement was obtained [5]. Test ordering behaviour has been studied in 98 family
practitioners. The correlation between decisions predicted by the model and choices
observed in practice was 0.74 [7]. Paper patients thus isolate judgments from the process of
gathering information, allow comparisons between clinicians to be made on a standard
basis, allow the testing of repeated judgments and reflect the judgments clinicians make when
seeing real patients.
DIFFERENCES AND VARIATIONS IN JUDGMENT
Using paper patients it is a simple matter to demonstrate that doctors differ in their clinical
judgments of the same material. When a random sample of 48 UK rheumatologists assessed
the degree of change in disease severity in cases of rheumatoid arthritis the doctors'
judgments showed major disagreements [8] (Fig. 3). Even when the clinicians were asked to
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FIG. 2. Correlation between clinical scores (0-100) for real and equivalent 'paper' patients when
judging 'current disease activity' in rheumatoid arthritis. (Reproduced by permission from ref. 6.)
indicate only 'clinically important' changes considerable disagreement remained. Such
apparently major differences in judgment have also been found in rheumatologists in
Australia [9] and Canada [10], amongst general physicians [11] psychiatrists [12] radiologists
[13] and between general practitioners in the UK [5, 14].
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FIG. 3. Distribution of VAS scores -from five patients. Variation among 48 physicians in their
assessment of disease severity in five patients. Score +55 indicated maximum possible improvement
and —55 maximum deterioration. (Reproduced by permission from ref. 8.)
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These differences might result from inconsistency in the way some (or all) judges carry out
their task. The reliability or reproducibility of physicians'judgments has been measured in
studies that included duplicate sets of patient data [8, 10, 14]. In some tasks, the correlation
between repeated judgments made by some physicians has not been significantly different
from zero, but in the majority of cases physicians have proved reasonably (rs > 0.7) or highly
(rs>0.85) consistent. Individual clinicians often show a reasonably consistent judgment
policy over many months (and perhaps years). In one study [15], seven physicians made
judgments on identical sets of paper patients on two occasions one year apart. The stability
of their judgments over one year (rs = 0.70) compared favourably with the reliability of
duplicate judgments on each occasion (rs = 0.76). Similar stability was seen amongst a group
of general practitioners. A trainee, however, progressively shifted her policy over a six month
period so that it eventually approximated to that of her trainer [14]. This observation
reminds us that some time-dependent shifts in judgment policy may be both expected and
desirable. However, the fact remains that even highly consistent expert judges show marked
differences in their judgments about identical data sets [8-10]. The reasons must lie in the way
they make their judgments-the process by which each selects and combines the clinical
data, their 'judgment policies'.
MAKING DIFFERENT JUDGMENT POLICIES EXPLICIT
A first step in obtaining explicit judgment policies might be to request each physician to
describe his or her own approach to combining the data. Such descriptions could be in the
form of weights allocated to a set of variables to indicate the contribution each makes to the
overall judgment, or in the form of detailed and carefully considered descriptions of the use
of each variable. Physicians are easily able to adopt either of these methods of describing
their judgment policies as they perceive them to be, and large differences between their
policies emerge with either method [14, 16].
Unfortunately, when the weights from these perceived policies are applied to observations
on patients, or to the ratings of paper patients, they result in judgments which show relatively
little correspondence with those made by the physicians when they actually see their patients
or judge the paper patients in question [16]. In fact, these 'specified' weights may prove no
better than giving equal weight to all the data, and explain only about 40 per cent of the
variance in judgments. Thus, the descriptions provided by expert physicians of their
judgment policies offer little real insight into the cause of those differences.
Regression modelling, based on the lens model paradigm, provides a practical approach
to describing how doctors use predefined data to make judgments. The regression equations
are used as models of the judgment process, though in fact they are only one way (among
many) of combining the data to arrive at the same kind of output as the judge [17]. The
models are descriptive in a mathematical rather than a psychological sense, though it is
possible that they may also represent correct psychological models. In either case, they may
provide the judges with novel insights.
The most appropriate way of expressing the contribution each clinical variable, or cue,
makes to the model is open to debate [18]. The arguments seem to favour the relative
contribution to R2 (the square of the multiple correlation coefficient of the regression
equation) [18, 19]. Here the change in R2 which occurs when a cue is omitted from the
equation is compared to that when each of the other cues are omitted in turn. Standardized
regression coefficients may be equally good where intercorrelations between the predictor
variables are close to zero. The risk of'overfitting' and capitalizing on chance relationships
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within the data which is inherent in all multiple regression approaches can be reduced by
imposing a 'penalty' against equations containing many variables.
Regression models calculated in this way are frequently able to explain a high proportion
of judgment variance: for example, the pooled value taken from one study of 89
rheumatologists was 73 per cent [16]. When models calculated from judgments made on an
initial set of data were applied to a new set of patients they explained 88 per cent of the
variance; however, rheumatologists' specified judgment policies, even described after all
their judgments had been made, could explain only 34 per cent. It seems, therefore, that the
policy equations provide an adequate and consistent model of clinical judgment with greater
validity within the area of judgment tested than physicians' own perceived policies, and can
therefore be used to compare the judgment policies of different clinicians with reasonable
confidence. Further details of the use of linear models to analyse physicians' decisions have
been recently reviewed [20].
COMPARING POLICY MODELS
Two rheumatologists who worked together in the same department and shared the care of
the same group of patients took part in a study comparing clinical judgment of disease
severity [21]. Their models showed little agreement in the relative importance of the clinical
variables (Fig. 4). Furthermore, the specified policies described by the clinicians bore little
resemblance to those calculated from their actual judgments. Indeed, the doctors held quite
similar beliefs about their clinical behaviour and without deeper information it would be
difficult to discover why they differed systematically in their assessments of certain patients.
This information was provided by regression models developed from their judgments on 50
paper patients. These revealed that their actual policies were quite different - the patient's
global assessment upon which rheumatologist B placed so much weight was totally ignored
by rheumatologist A.
OF WHAT USE IS POLICY MODELLING?
Given that differences in expert clinical judgment can be appreciated and measured, to what
further use can this information be put?
Rheumatologist A
Relative
contributio
Relative
importance °
a* perceived
by Doctor
FIG. 4. Actual (modelled) and perceived contributions of clinical variables to two rheumatologists'
judgments of disease severity. The clinical variables were: articular index (AI); functional capacity
(FC); pain; early morning stiffness (EMS); patients global assessment (GLOB). (Reproduced by
permission from ref. 21.)
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The first benefit is in the individual's greater appreciation of the consistency of his own
judgment processes. In addition, an explicit model enables him to examine the importance he
attaches in practice to clinical data, to modify the model consciously and to apply the revised
form with consistency. But further than that, analysis of clinical judgment provides a tool for
helping to coordinate the judgment of several physicians. Diagnostic models based on actual
judgments made by general practitioners will, for example, allow predictions to be made as
to which cases of otitis media will cause disagreement in future (Fig. 5). This example
illustrates the false agreement which might result if discussion rather than policy modelling
were used. It will allow these doctors to consider how their management of identifiable
patients might differ as a consequence of their different policies. It may be that the
consequences will be clinically trivial; on the other hand they may feel it important to reach a
consensus policy on diagnosis to avoid undesirable variations in treatment.
Two further investigations illustrate these advantages. In the first, two clinicians wished to
coordinate their policies for the inclusion of patients in an international study of rheumatoid
arthritis. They had agreed upon the entry criteria but sought further advice about even better
coordination. Each was asked to judge the suitability for entry of 90 paper patients; the
correlation between their judgments, a measure of their agreement, was r = 0.63. The two
clinicians then spent one hour discussing in detail the decisions each had made. Following
this feedback on the outcome of their judgments, each separately assessed 30 further
patients. The correlation between the second set of judgments was r = 0.64, showing little
change. Their clinical decisions were analysed separately and each was supplied with
graphical representations of the clinical importance attached to variables in both of their
judgment models. They met and discussed these models for a further hour before once more
assessing 60 paper patients. The agreement between them after this 'process' feedback
improved (r = 0.76) [22]. This confirms earlier suggestions [23] that feedback provided by
judgment analysis can improve agreement when unaided discussion or 'outcome' feedback
fails.
The second example relates to routine clinical practice. Three physicians attempted to
coordinate their judgment of disease severity when reviewing outpatients with rheumatoid
DOCTOR 1 DOCTOR 2
Model
Policy
RED
[fit 9 1%]
Expressed
Policy
RED or
DULL and
PINK and
PAINFUL
[fit 8 7%]
Predicted Judgements
Agree In 93% Of Cases
•Predicted Judgements
Agree In 58% Of Cases
Model
Policy
RED or
PINK or
INJECTED
[fit 88%]
Expressed
Policy
RED or
PINK or
INJECTED
and BULGING
[fit 8 4%]
TT
Predicted Judgements
Agree In 83% Of Cases
Predicted Judgements -*
Agree In 80% Of Cases
FIG. 5. Modelled and expressed (perceived) policies for two doctors using appearances of the tympanic
membrane to diagnose otitis media. Application of their expressed policies would lead to a predicted
agreement over 80 per cent of the cases. In reality they would agree over only 58 per cent as a
comparison of their modelled policies shows. (Reproduced by permission from ref. 14.)
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arthritis. At the end of a three month period, during which judgments and clinical data were
collected, judgment policy models were calculated for each doctor and displayed in the clinic
rooms. These models were applied to a fresh set of case data and used to predict the judgment
that each doctor would make if he were perfectly consistent in the application of his policy.
The correlation between the predicted judgments of one pair of doctors was particularly low
indicating considerable differences in their judgment policies (Fig. 6). When assessing
patients over the next three months they were able to see all three policy models, as well as
predicted assessments for each consecutive incoming patient based on computer calculations
performed and displayed 'real time' in the clinic. Each doctor was thus able to see what
decisions his colleagues would have made had they been seeing the patient. At the end of this
period their policy models were calculated once more. By applying both sets of policy models
to data collected from further patients it was possible to examine changes in agreement over
the three month period of feedback. Figure 6 shows that the correlation between two of the
participants improved dramatically from r = 0.54 to r = 0.99 [24]. It appeared that real-time
display of other physicians' assessments of each patient encouraged convergence of the
judgment policies.
Another area where judgment analysis may help is in the design and conduct of clinical
trials. Patients included in a trial must fairly represent the population of patients seen by
those who read the report. In a study of published trials in bacterial otitis media, trial
diagnostic criteria for admission were compared with those derived from the judgment
analysis models of 27 general practitioners. Half of these doctors disagreed with the
diagnosis in the majority of patients who would have been considered suitable for entry into
the trials. It is difficult to know to what use these doctors could have put the results. At the
moment diagnostic criteria for entry into trials are chosen solely by the trialists themselves. It
seems likely that the relevance and value of clinical trials could be improved by modelling the
diagnostic criteria if the doctors who will be using the results of the trial and making sure
thay match the trial admission criteria. [25, 26]. Such methods would allow the construction
of operational models of disease not just as they are seen by doctors but by patients, relatives
and health care planners as well. Differences between such models may give insights into how
cooperative health care may be planned better.
Trials lacking the power to detect clinically important effects have been frequently
criticised. Although it has been tacitly assumed that everyone knew what these important
effects were, recent studies (for example in the medical management of hypertension) have
suggested that what doctors may consider a success, patients' relatives may rate as a failure
[27].
But do doctors even agree upon the definition of treatment success? To find out, the
judgment policies of 56 rheumatologists were modelled using 50 paper patients. Each
'patient' provided two sets of measurements on ten clinical variables recorded before and
after one year's treatment. The rheumatologists were asked to estimate the size of any change
in disease severity that had taken place and whether the change was clinically significant or
not. Although all the rheumatologists were of consultant or senior registrar status they
showed little agreement over which patients had shown important improvement (K = 0.3).
Some patients were considered significantly improved by certain physicians and significantly
worse by others! Inspection of their calculated judgment policy models showed that while
some variables entered most doctors' models, others were unevenly represented and were a
cause of major variation in judgement [28,30]. If every member of a collaborative research
group is shown his or her policy in this way, it becomes possible to hold a truly informed
discussion of differences, so that a uniform policy can be agreed. The value of judgment
analysis in increasing the power and relevance of clinical trials is discussed in detail elsewhere
[29, 30].
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FIG. 6. Agreement between two rheumatologists in routine patient assessment. Predicted disease
severity scores obtained by applying the policy models of two rheumatologists to new patient data (a)
before feedback, (b) after feedback from clinical judgment analysis. (Reproduced by permission from
ref. 24.)
Whether such judgment modelling would in fact aid a consensus about trial end points is
as yet untested. However, the retrospective application of judgment analysis to trial data
showed how valuable this approach might be. Fifty-six patients entered a double-blind
placebo-controlled trial of a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agent. The four physicians
who assessed the patients were asked to make an overall judgment about the benefit their
patients had derived from treatment (Table 1). The treatment was more effective than
placebo (x2 = 42.5, P<0.05). Judgment analysis was performed on each of the physicians,
relating overall benefit tothe clinical measures recorded during the trial. Patients were then
reclassified using the policy of the doctor who had assessed them. This eliminated the
random variation and inconsistency of each clinician in applying his own policy. The new
patient categories, of which the mean scores are shown in column B, indicate a greater
distinction between treatment and placebo (/2 = 49.4), showing that the reduced variability
of the judgments has reduced the variance of the trial and hence increased its discriminating
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TABLE 1. Patients classified by doctor's judgment of overall
efficacy (0-3).
Mean score 0 1 2 3 /}
Actual judgments
Treatment 1-92 1 7 23 6
Placebo 105 7 6 4 2
Judgments reclassified using CJA
Treatment 203 0 6 24 7
Placebo 105 6 7 5 1 y ' 5
power. Greater power can be obtained by applying the policy of a particular physician to all
the observations, or by applying a consensual policy to all patients. These methods would
(unlike the example given above) impose a uniform policy for all patients; the first has been
used in a trial of antidepressive drugs [25] with predictable improvement in the power of the
trial.
Several groups have considered what information a clinical trial report should contain
[31]. However, there is little information about what data readers of clinical trial reports
actually use when reaching decisions about the treatments under test. Clinical judgment
analysis can help to identify those items of information that are selected and make their
weighting explicit. To this end, 38 rheumatologists were asked to judge how helpful 50 trial
reports were in deciding which (if any) of the treatments compared should be used. Each
report described the amount of information available in 11 categories including design,
conduct and analysis. Details of the experimental design and trial sampling procedure
received greatest weight, whereas the number of withdrawals and the reasons for them
appeared less important [32]. Studies of this kind can help trial producers improve the
convincing power of their reports by including the information readers use.
EDUCATION
It is doubtful if the environment of clinical medicine is suitable for students to learn by
'osmosis ' or by simply observing the decisions of experts and attempting to relate them to
items of patient data. Simultaneous presentation of many items of data (many of them non-
numerical), the need for rapid processing and the probabilistic relationship of clinical
variables to the underlying event predispose to an intuitive rather than an analytical
approach [33], Evidence from many sources strongly suggests that learning in such
environments may only occur effectively if students are given information not about the
outcome of an expert's judgment processes but some knowledge of the process itself [1].
The success of this approach has now been shown in at least one medical undergraduate
setting [34]. Allowing students to compare their own diagnostic policy models with those of
an expert (cognitive feedback) enabled them to learn the appropriate decision rule more
quickly than simple outcome feedback on the correctness of their diagnosis. Ideally, what is
the appropriate decision rule should be discovered from analysis of a large clinical data base
rather than by reference to expert weights. Where there is some 'gold s tandard ' for diagnosis,
such as laparotomy findings or pathology results, the 'correct weights' attributable to each
data item can be generated (Fig. 1). When cognitive feedback was used to teach student
health physicians the optimal policy for diagnosing streptococcal throat infections there
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were significant improvements in their diagnostic abilities. These were found to persist
beyond the experimental period into the doctors' clinical practice [35]. The same group, in a
study on the diagnosis of pulmonary embolism, used pulmonary angiography as a 'gold
standard' for establishing the diagnosis. This allowed 'ideal' or objective weights to be
attributed to each of the clinical predictor variables. Comparison of these weights with the
doctors' own weights derived by clinical judgment analysis showed that they attributed least
weight to the heart rate whereas it was the most important variable in the objective analysis.
Information of this sort allows doctors to conform their policies to one having established
diagnostic power. The obvious advantage over simply learning the weights handed out by an
'expert' are illustrated by the finding that, in this study, the policies of expert faculty
members were as variable as those of the students [36].
Judgment policy modelling offers a means of generating more uniform management
policies, carefully chosen and consciously adhered to by clinicians, both individually and in
groups. At a time when job rotations and duty rotas require patient care to be divided among
increasing numbers of physicians (and others), any help in making management policy both
explicit and consistent would be welcome.
HOW DO CLINICIANS REACT TO CLINICAL JUDGMENT ANALYSIS?
In the only study of this question of which we are aware, the reactions of general
practitioners in the UK ranged from full acceptance through amused tolerance to a rather
irritated dismissal of the study methods as 'totally artificial and invalid' [37]. However, even
busy general practitioners did not consider the task of making 50-60 sets of judgments
particularly arduous. One centre that had at first specifically asked to be involved later
wished to be dissociated from the study after considerable differences in diagnostic and
prescribing behaviour were revealed. In general, paper patients with otitis media were judged
to be not very life-like, but nevertheless computed judgment models were rated as 'credible'.
One large group practice, studied in detail, felt that the revealed differences in prescribing
behaviour were probably a fair reflection of the truth; and although it was considered
important that differences be resolved they believed this could only be done with difficulty.
Nevertheless, several doctors felt that their own policies had changed as a result of seeing
them in the perspective of judgment policies of other practice members, though whether this
belief was justified was not tested.
Most general practitioners work in a highly intuition-inducing real-life environment in
which large amounts of data, often pictorial, are presented simultaneously or over a few
minutes. Many diagnostic and therapeutic decisions have to be made within a short period of
time if the day's work is to be accomplished. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that these
decisions have to be made with a high degree of confidence and accuracy if professional
appearances and status are to be maintained. Under these circumstances it is understandable
that an approach which allows disclosure of inconsistency or conflict of judgments may be
unwelcome [38].
Rheumatologists on the other hand work more often with numerical data and to them
printed simulations may differ little from standard hospital records and summaries. Many
are associated with undergraduate or postgraduate education and so are used to exposing
their decision policies to scrutiny. Most were content to participate in the studies for their
own sake and, unlike the general practitioners, required little convincing of their ultimate
value in terms of improved patient care. Psychiatrists on the other hand, though generally
lacking reliable (or valid) methods of measurement that can be exteriorized are generally
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aware of their need for help in reducing sources of variation. Consequently they have
generally accepted the help provided by judgment analysis when it has been offered.
WHERE NEXT?
Judgment analysis has been used to make statistically firm models of doctors' diagnostic and
therapeutic decisions. However the promise of this approach has not yet been translated into
measured improvements in the standard of patient care. Prejudice against the use of
computer technology is not an obvious cause - the use of desk-top microcomputers as
information sources seems widely acceptable amongst general physicians and hospital
doctors - yet many have expressed serious reservations about the analyses involved in
clinical judgment analysis. This may be justified if the regression models are presented as
representations of how the doctor making the judgments actually thinks, instead of, as most
Brunswikians probably believe, as paramorphic models of'the doctor thinks as if. . .'. The
implication remains that these models may nevertheless help decision-takers gain insight
into what is really happening. Whether such insight is ever revealed is, of course, unknown
since what 'really happens' remains inaccessible. The unfamiliar form of the regression
models does however psychologically distance the doctors whose judgments have been
modelled. Models that suggest unpalatable inconsistency or discordance can easily be
discarded on grounds of irrelevance. Unfortunately it is in just these situations that doctors
need help with the resolution of conflicts. The superiority of social judgment analysis over
Delphi and the nominal group technique at achieving consensus among groups has already
been demonstrated [39]. Whether clinical judgment analysis will prove equally successful
with groups of doctors remains to be seen. It will depend in part on whether participants can
admit the possibility of inconsistency and even error and how committed they are to reaching
a consensus. KR Hammond has proposed that unless they admit to desperation, judgment
analysis is unlikely to help resolve conflicts of judgment between participants. Where
decisions concern matters of ethics rather than matters of science judges often seem most
reluctant to abandon their prepared positions. Even here clinical judgment analysis may help
reveal some of the underlying factors. In a study of decisions over the use of tube feeding in
seriously ill patients, physicians could be classified as more or less paternalistic according to
the weights attributed to patient preferences [40].
Expert systems that do not draw on statistical databases must use knowledge elicited from
experts. The finding that experts have difficulty describing their judgment processes suggests
that more objective procedures may be required to obtain this knowledge other than simply
asking the expert to explain his reasoning. Clinical judgment analysis offers a method of
knowledge elicitation which has wide applicability [41]. However, because the procedure
aims to create statistically firm models, it is considerably more time consuming than
traditional interview methods. So far, it has only been used in situations where decisions are
simple one-step affairs in which all the relevant data items can be considered simultaneously.
Whether clinical judgment analysis would remain a practical alternative in the multi-stage
discriminatory tasks usually associated with medical diagnosis remains to be seen. A
potential disadvantage of mathematical models lies in their very mathematical form. This
may be a highly efficient description of their function and an aid to their application, but it
bears little resemblance to the generally accepted medical model of disease and its treatment.
This is of little importance in expert systems that are not designed to be interrogated, but will
need disguising in knowledge-based systems designed to have explanatory facilities.
A major attraction of the lens-model paradigm and its regression modelling approach lies
in its general applicability to many problems of human judgment and these have recently
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been reviewed [42]. Its ability to operate outside biological or sociological areas of expertise
permits involvement of the scientifically naive. Several studies have shown how Brunswikian
methods involving lay persons have improved experts' understandings of public needs in the
field of social policy formation [43-45]. Patients' needs and expectations of treatments are
obvious targets within the medical field. So far we know little about how patients weight the
efficacy and toxicity in judging the acceptability of treatments. A series of studies examined
doctors' and patients' decisions to recommend or accept hormone replacement therapy.
Judgment analysis was used to examine the weights attached to the benefits and risks of this
treatment. Patients' policies clustered into four groups depending on the importance they
attached to relief of hot flushes, the risk of osteoporosis, resumption of cyclical bleeding and
the risk of cancer. Cancer risk featured prominently in the physicians' models while many
patients appeared more concerned with the mortality and morbidity of fractures [46]. This
information should help the development of consensus management plans incorporating
patients' and possibly relatives' models as well as those of the medical team.
If rational analysis of judgment policies (rather than intuitive guessing) proves as helpful,
for instance, as measuring haemoglobin concentrations (rather than guessing their value
from the colour of the nailbed) we can look forward to many developments in this area.
These advances, using modern technology as an aid rather than a replacement, would
expand rather than contract the physician's role in treating his patients, just as the pathology
laboratory and other technical developments have done in the past.
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